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SURVEY OF FRENCH UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS

Description

The strength of the French underground; the degree of unification achieved; the various constituent groups; the military effectives.

28 January 1944

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SUMMARY

1. The French underground enjoys the support of the vast majority of Frenchmen. It has been unified through the establishment of the National Council of Resistance. Since 1942 the underground has recognized the leadership of de Gaulle. The Consultative Assembly provides the underground with a vehicle for expression independent of the French Committee for National Liberation.

2. The underground is agreed on certain policies: (a) that the French Committee should function as the provisional government of France; (b) that quisling elements in France should be purged; (c) that a Consultative Assembly should function beside the provisional government. The underground, while anxious for Anglo-American friendship, is critical of Allied policy with regard to French affairs.

3. The resistance movement is composed of organizations of three types (a) pure resistance groups; (b) Trade Union groups; (c) political parties. The most important pure resistance groups are: Combat, Libération, Franc-Tireur, Front National, Ceux de la Résistance, Ceux de la Libération, Organisation Civile et Militaire. Trade Union resistance centers round the illegally reconstituted national organizations, the Conféderation Génerale du Travail and the Conféderation Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens. Of the old parties, only the Communist, Socialist, and, to a lesser degree, the Radical Socialist parties have succeeded in establishing an extensive underground network. Catholics and Protestants collaborate in anti-German propaganda based on Christian principles.

4. The various underground groups have a very considerable military potential, coordinated into one Armée Secrète, which is divided into (a) the Armée Secrète proper, to take the field at the time of Allied invasion; and (b) Action Immédiate, for specific sabotage and guerrilla actions. Both types lack adequate supplies of military equipment.

SURVEY OF FRENCH UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS

I. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE

A. Introduction

A French underground resistance movement has existed since the second half of 1940. By the end of 1940 there were perhaps as many as eighty separate groups, with little or no liaison between them, and with a wide range of divergent political attitudes.[1] The liaison problem was complicated by the division of France into three different zones, the Unoccupied Zone, the Occupied Zone, and the Forbidden Zone in the North East, communications between zones being severely restricted. The political divergences were an inevitable legacy from the last days of the Third Republic, carried further in the inevitable process of examining the causes of defeat. The growth of the Resistance movement is primarily the result of the measure of unification achieved on both the organizational and ideological levels.

B. Organizational Unification

Towards the end of 1941, as a result of contacts made inside France, out of the confusion of small groups there began to appear a restricted number of major organizations, Combat, Libération, Franc-Tireur in the Unoccupied Zone, and Libération and the Front National in the Occupied Zone.

The next phase of unification, a gradual process spread over the whole of 1942, was the establishment of the Fighting French in London as the liaison center for resistance in metropolitan France, and the recognition of de Gaulle as the leader of resistance. By the end of 1942 the resistance movement as a whole, with some minor exceptions, had taken this step.[1] The reasons for this development are various. De Gaulle could offer liaison facilities as well as financial and other material support to organizations which needed them badly. De Gaulle's organization constituted a channel for military liaison with the Western Democracies, whose future invasion of France was the event for which the underground was preparing. De Gaulle provided a symbol of resistance which united groups of divergent tendency.

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[1] Castellane in France Libre, 16 August 1943.

After the establishment of Fighting France in London as a center of unification, the next step was the achievement of further unification inside France. By the spring of 1943 the three main South Zone organizations had been united into the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* (MUR), agreeing to merge their paramilitary organizations and their youth sections, while keeping their propaganda organs independent. A directing committee of four was set up, one representative from each organization and one representative of de Gaulle. In the North Zone a similar coordinating committee was set up by the principal organizations.[2]

In May 1943, the final step was taken of setting up a National Council of Resistance inside France, formally composed of one delegate from each of eight resistance organizations (three from the South Zone, five from the North Zone), two clandestine Trade Unions and six political parties. This National Council of Resistance is the only body coordinating the action and policies of resistance as a whole.

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[1] CID #37126, April 1943.

[2] Plain cable London #7495, 29 October 1943; *Combat*, 15 May 1943; OSS, R and A, London, 21 June 1943; CID #25602, 19 December 1942.

It is said to have ten to fifteen departments dealing with different aspects of resistance, as (1) day-to-day action against the Germans; (2) coordination with Allied invasion; (3) the *Maquis*; and (4) post-war problems. When the Consultative Assembly was set up, it was the National Council of Resistance which designated the delegates of metropolitan resistance from among the representatives of the constituent organizations. The National Council only meets irregularly (it has met about four times); complete coordination of resistance is a practical impossibility.[1]

Since the establishment of the National Council of Resistance, and according to its general directive, unification has been pushed at the regional and local levels. "Departmental Committees of Resistance," uniting all groups, and, on a local scale, "Committees of Fighting France" are being set up. These groups will direct whatever action the underground takes at the time of invasion.[2]

A further indication of the trend towards unity is the formation of a united youth movement (see below, II, F).

The official contact between the French underground and the French Committee for National Liberation is through the Commissariat of the Interior, a post which has been held by representatives of the underground (André Philip and Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie). Other contacts are available

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1. Frenay in *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 October 1943 d'Astier in *France-Amérique*, 5 December 1943. It is not clear how far the scheme for representation was realized, compare OSS #16731, 15 May 1943. The formation of the Council is foreshadowed in *Libération*, 30 March 1943, and recognized in *Combat* #48, 25 September 1943.
2. CID #48835, 23 October 1943; *Action* #1, October 1943; *Libération*, Lyon ed., #5, September 1943.

through channels built up by the *Bureau Centrale de Renseignements de l'Armée* (BCRA) and by Colonel Passy on behalf of the Fighting French military organization.[1]

The French underground has at its disposal machinery for making its wishes known to a government in exile which other European undergrounds do not have. Apart from statements issued by the National Council of Resistance which, in view of the presence of representatives of resistance who could disown these statements, should be taken at their face value, it has its delegates to the Consultative Assembly at Algiers. It is certain that the nominations of the delegates representing metropolitan resistance, which constitute the controlling bloc in the Consultative Assembly, were not controlled by de Gaulle or the French Committee for National Liberation. The Resistance delegates came to Algiers with instructions to the effect that the immediate tasks of the Consultative Assembly were (1) the subordination of the military to the civil authority; (2) the designation of one head of the government within the French Committee of National Liberation; (3) the purge of both military and political cadres. The dissatisfaction of the delegates with the progress of the purge, and on the vital issue of arming the underground, has in fact strained relations between the underground and the French Committee.[2]

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[1] Passy has been accused of using violent methods, of urging de Gaulle to set up a personal dictatorship, and of using various pressures to obtain adherence to de Gaulle: CID #49499 and #49238. It is not credible that threats and violence account for the underground's general adherence to de Gaulle. It is not clear that the civilian resistance movement uses the channels of the Giraudist *Service de Renseignements* (SR) and *Sécurité Militaire* (SM) which Gaullists distrust as not being secure. CID #53916, 13 January 1944.

[2] CID #50068, November 1943; OSS Algiers, 20 December 1943 Censorship (London) Ref. LON/IPD/220846/43. For the underground press attitude to Consultative Assembly, see *La Voix du Nord* #61, October 1943.

Their independence is further shown by the tendency for the Consultative Assembly to acquire more than a purely consultative rôle, in accordance with the wishes of the majority, who believe that this would, amongst other things, help to allay Anglo-American doubts as to the democratic character of the Gaullist movement.

With regard to the resistance movements recognition of de Gaulle's leadership, it has been stated so often as scarcely to merit repetition that the Gaullisme of resistance as a whole does not imply partisan support for policies or ambitions which de Gaulle may entertain.

C. The Constituent Organizations of the National Council of Resistance

1. Resistance Movements

a. South Zone

Combat Libération Franc-Tireur	Mouvements Unis de Résistance (MUR)

b. North Zone

Libération
Front National
Ceux de la Libération
Ceux de la Résistance
Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM)

2. Trade Unions

Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC)

3. Political Parties

Communist Party
Socialist Party
Radical Party
Démocrates Populaires

Alliance Démocratique

Fédération Républicaine, or Union Républicaine Démocratique (URD)

D. The Policies and Attitudes of the Underground

1. Introduction. Reference has already been made to the divergences in political attitude which originally separated different groups in the underground. Although these divergences have not disappeared, at the present juncture they are divergences within the framework of unity. The basic fact at present is the ideological unity of the underground. This has come about in two ways: (a) the political experience gained in resistance, together with the political discussion carried on in the underground press, has brought about a definite measure of genuine agreement on basic principles; (b) the deeply felt need for French unity has created a willingness to reach a compromise on all immediate issues. It is therefore legitimate to speak of the policy of the French underground.

The policies and attitudes common to the French underground as a whole will be considered under the following headings: (1) attitude to the Allies; (2) policy with regard to the provisional government of France; and (3) post-war aims.

2. Attitude to the Allies. The basic inspiration of French resistance is French nationalism. With regard to Great Britain and the USA the attitude of the underground is complex. It began with a definite conception that its ideological affinity is with the western democracies; it is aware that the western democracies will be its liberators. At the same time the underground has been critical of Anglo-American policy with regard to French affairs on several points:

a. With reference to North African affairs, the underground did not like the continuance in office of Vichy men, and the by-passing of the political leadership of de Gaulle and the French National Committee in favor of Giraud, after resistance had rallied to the banner of de Gaulle.[1]

b. The underground does not understand why the French Committee for National Liberation has not been given full recognition as the provisional government of France, or why American recognition of the Vichy government has not been formally cancelled.[2]

c. The underground cannot see any justification for the failure to supply them with arms.

These criticisms have generated a definite suspicion of Allied intentions. The resistance groups suspect the possibility of a deal with Vichy at their expense; they suspect the Allies of interference in the domestic affairs of France (as they see it) to the extent of blocking the realization of certain points in their own program which they consider essential -- for example the "purge" and the subordination of the military to the civilian authority; they suspect the Allies of planning to use an AMG administration in France, to an extent not justified by purely military considerations; they suspect that the failure to arm them was predicated on opposition to their internal program, which, they insist, is not one of social revolution but of a purge of anti-national elements. These suspicions are unfortunate but characteristic expressions of the sensitive nationalism of resistance. Allied rebuffs to de Gaulle, and de Gaulle's intransigeance, have been a major factor in crystallizing Gaullist sentiment in resistance **and among** the French as a whole.[1]

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[1] Cf. The statement to the British and American governments signed by *Combat*, *Franc-Tireur*, *Libération*, *Mouvement Ouvrier Français*, *Comité d'Action Socialiste*, Radical Party, Popular-Democratic Party, and Republican Federation in *Libération* (South Zone), 15 November 1942; *Populaire*, November 1942; *Voix du Nord*, February 1943; *Combat*, November and December 1942; January, February, June, September, October 1943; *Libération* (South Zone), 15 May 1943; *Libération* (South Zone), 1 December 1942; *Résistance*, 4 February and 23 June 1943; *Franc-Tireur*, November 1942 and February 1943; *Populaire*, December-January 1943, March 1943; *Populaire*, September 1943 ("message to President Roosevelt"); Communist position in *La Vie Ouvrière* and *L'Humanité*, January 1943, and OSS source A #15929, 25 November 1943.

[2] PID, *Supplement on French Clandestine Press*, July-September 1943, and October 1943; CID #42958, 14 July 1943; Grenier in *Les Documents*, 1 February 1943; *Les Cahiers Français*, 13 June 1943.

Grave as these suspicions are, they should not be construed as tantamount to alienation from the USA and Great Britain. The language used in the "Letters to the American people" and "Letters to President Roosevelt" that have appeared in clandestine press is consistently that of a friendly nation appealing to another friendly nation. The underground believes that "lack of time information" or even "fifth column influences" have perverted the natural amity that should prevail between France and the US.[2] They are prepared to concede that mistakes have been made on their part: one of them writes "we have probably made mistakes since June 1940; the Allies also have their responsibilities. All that is passed. Americanophobia and Anglophobia are contrary to the interest of all."[3]

As regards the USSR, there is very great admiration for Russian military achievements, but no particular inclination to find in the successes of Russian arms an argument for the adoption of the Russian social system. The form of recognition granted the FCNL by the USSR was no doubt more

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1. OSS source A #17934, 30 December 1943; CID #37126, April 1943; CID #48117, 20 June 1943; CID #54704, 20 January 1944.
2. OSS, Daily Intelligence Report, 19 October 1943.
3. Combat, 17 October 1943.

satisfactory to the underground than the form of Anglo-American recognition; however, no overt comparisons can be found in the underground press. It should also be remembered that the USSR has enjoyed the advantage of non-involvement in all the strains on good relations imposed by military operations in the territory of an ally.

3. Policy with Regard to Provisional Government of France. While a detailed program has not been settled, certain broad principles can be stated as expressing the point of view of the underground as a whole.

a. Resistance wants the French Committee for National Liberation recognized as the provisional government of France, and hence the supreme civil authority in metropolitan France after liberation and after the period of military government prescribed by military necessities. A change in the personnel of the Committee is envisaged.[1]

b. A national assembly should assist the provisional government, but this cannot be the National Assembly composed of the old Senate and Chamber, nor can it be constituted by recourse to the Treveneuc law (which arranges for the election of a provisional assembly by the departmental (conseils généraux), because the Senate, Chamber, and conseils généraux include discredited elements.[2]

c. A Consultative Assembly should function as the support of the provisional government, and as the guarantor of democracy. The Consultative Assembly should be constituted by representatives of both the resistance movements and

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1. Statement of National Council of Resistance in France (London) 1 January 1943.
2. CID #42958C, 14 July 1943; PID Supplement on French Clandestine Press, July-September 1943; Résistance, 17 July 1943; Franc-Tireur, March 1943.

political parties, and perhaps some other groups.[1]

d. Local administrations should be based on an amalgam between (a) such of the existing or previously existing administrations as are not compromised by collaborationism; and (b) representatives of resistance.

e. The tasks of the provisional government, apart from economic reconstruction, should include (1) restoration of democratic liberties, and cancellation of the Vichy system; (2) a purge of compromised elements from administrative cadres, the punishment of traitors, and the confiscation of the property of businessmen who have collaborated with the Germans.[2] A distinction is drawn between notorious and conspicuous collaborationists, whom the underground wants condemned to death by the speediest possible judicial procedure, and the general run of collaborationists whom they want immediately arrested and tried. Elements which they regard as compromised, but not guilty of any zeal in the persecution of the underground, they want removed from their functions. (3) The provisional government should make preparations for a new Constitution, and for the holding of a new election after the return of the prisoners from Germany.

4. Post-War Aims

a. In the political sphere, there is agreement on the principle of parliamentary democracy. A minority current in resistance, which has a critical attitude towards parliamentary democracy, seems now to be working for a strengthening of the executive branch within a democratic frame, rather than for any substitute for parliamentary democracy.[1]

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[1] CID #42958C, 14 July 1943.

[2] *Voix du Nord*, October 1943; *Franc-Tireur*, 15 July 1943, *L'Espoir*, September 1943; a purge of the press, according to d'Astier in *France-Amérique*, 5 December 1943; CID #34809, 19 May 1943; *Résistance*, 23 January 1943; *Franc-Tireur*, September 1942.

b. In the field of social and economic legislation, resistance as a whole is leftist in complexion. The conservative wing of the clandestine press admits the principle of state-control of key industries and financial institutions; the radical wing urges state-ownership; all distinguish an economic sector which should be free from a sector which should be controlled. The principle of state responsibility for individual welfare is generally accepted.[2]

E. The Relations between the Underground and the Rest of the Population

On a conservative estimate, 90 percent of the French population are anti-German. Estimates of the number in contact with resistance groups have little scientific value: General Delattre de Tassigny estimates them at just under one million. Other estimates have been as high as eight million. A calculation based on information on one town gives the figure of 575,000 men capable of military action organized in resistance groups.[3]

Beyond the circle of actual members of resistance groups is the circle of those contacted by the clandestine press. Algiers claims that the clandestine press circulates 1,200,000 **copies a month.** Perhaps as many as four to eight readers for each copy seems a reasonable hypothesis; at the same time deduction should be made for copies confiscated. Perhaps four million readers a month is a

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1. CID #42958C, 14 July 1943; CID #39194.
2. Cf. Hauriou in *Combat* (Alger) #87-8, 5, 12 December 1943; CID #51336; Waldeck-Rochet in *France* (London) 3 and 8 January 1943; Censorship London, Ref. LON/IPD/220846/43; CID #39194; *Franc-Tireur*, March 1943; *Populaire*. 18 June 1942, 7 November 1942; *Défense de la France*, 5 February, 20 March, and 20 October 1943.
3. OSS source A, #17720, 29 December 1943.

conservative estimate: some allowance should also be made on the assumption that the same readers do not absorb the circulation every month. This figure should be compared with the present population of France (38 million). The conclusion appears to be that although the distinction between the vanguard of active resistance and the anti-German but inactive majority is real, the vanguard is not isolated from the majority.

As regards the relation between social stratification and resistance, the following generalizations seem permissible, it being understood that these generalizations are statements of support for the resistance movement, rather than actual membership in resistance groups.

1. The backbone of resistance as a mass movement are the workers with a Trade Union background.[1]

2. The petit bourgeois (small shopkeepers etc.) are with resistance, primarily because of Republican traditions, but also because of the pauperization from which they have suffered as a result of both German and Vichy economic policy.

3. The lower ranks of the civil service, especially the teachers, are with resistance, as are a majority of the liberal professions, though there are conspicuous exceptions.[2]

4. The peasants, though they have received favored treatment from Vichy, are discontented, but did not play an active role in resistance until the program of deporting labor for Germany hit them along with the rest of the population. At present they may be said to be anti-Vichy, and, while entertaining anxieties about disorder and distrust of the Communist element, they will certainly not oppose the resistance

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[1] CID #39014.
[2] Rucart in France (London) 20 October 1943.

movement and probably will go along with it.[1]

5. The lower ranks of the clergy are with resistance, and have rendered it notable services. The upper hierarchy, though condemning individual measures such as the anti-Jewish legislation, has not for the most part abandoned the theory of the legitimacy of the Vichy government (see V).

6. Women, as such, have shown no hesitation with regard to resistance; their record has been remarkable.

7. The majority of the Army officers, and even larger majority of the naval officers, have not come to terms with the resistance movement, primarily because of its leftist connections. A minority has worked with resistance, and because of their qualifications have occupied a higher proportion of the positions of leadership than corresponds to their numbers in resistance.

8. Only a minority of the higher civil servants, and representatives of finance and industry have committed themselves to support of resistance. Attentisme is here the dominant trend. Those who have worked with resistance have been in a position to render unique services.

General support of the resistance movement is not incompatible with a critical attitude towards this or that policy of resistance or of the French Committee for National Liberation.[2]

Finally it should be noted that in certain explosive situations, which will be repeated in a magnified form at the time of liberation, resistance has shown itself capable of mobilizing virtually the entire population of a locality. In some of the remoter rural areas the resistance movement has been able to operate continuously, virtually in the open, between periodic visitations of the *gardes mobiles*.[1]

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[1] Philip in France (London) 25 October 1943.
[2] OSS #24920, 15 November 1943; OSS source A #16689, 8 December 1943; OSS source A #16379, 4 December 1943.

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[1] OSS Algiers, 3 November 1943; OSS source B #24159, 1 December 1943; OSS source A #18540 C.

II. THE "PURE RESISTANCE" GROUPS

A. Les Mouvements Unis de Résistance (MUR)[1]

1. Combat

a. The Growth of Combat: Combat is the largest of the South Zone organizations united in the Mouvements Unis de Résistance, and the least homogeneous. The organization, now identified by the name of its paper, was originally known as Libération Française, which first published a paper called Combat in December 1941. Libération Française was formed by an amalgamation of two other groups, Libération Nationale and Liberté, both of which were founded towards the end of 1940. The character of the two groups whose amalgamation produced Libération Française is symbolized by the personalities of the two men who were the moving spirits in them, and who are now in Algiers as members of the French Committee for National Liberation: Henri Frenay and François de Menthon. Henri Frenay was an officer of the French Army who resigned his commission immediately after the Armistice, and soon afterwards was engaged in organizing Libération Nationale.[2] Libération Nationale[3] was an organization of Army officers, particularly members of the General Staff and the Deuxième Bureau of whom General de la Laurencie was perhaps the highest. They supported (October 1940) the internal program of Pétain's

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[1] General Source: OSS, R & A, reports on the French Underground of March, June, September 1943.

[2] OSS Biographical Records, #1605.

[3] Libération Nationale published in 1941, Les Petites Ailes, Vérités, and a paper called Résistance (not to be confused with the paper of Ceux de Résistance, founded in 1942). See also CID 18927, 4 June 1942.

National Revolution, but insisted that the National Revolution must come after National Liberation; hence they opposed collaboration. Reflecting both the tendency to blame the British for the disaster of 1940, and Pétain's "France alone" mystique, they refused to accept orders or aid from England, while recognizing that they were working for a British victory. Their program was to mobilize anti-German sentiment, while waiting for the day when the Army would again take the field against the Germans. With regard to Pétain, they felt he was surrounded by bad advisers, and that their movement expressed the views which Pétain would express if he were free. In this feeling they were encouraged in their contacts with certain high Vichy officials, including Pucheu. From the start they were strongly anti-Communist, and continued to be so after the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR.[1]

The moving spirit behind Liberté, the other group which went to form Libération Française, was François de Menthon.[2] De Menthon comes from an aristocratic family, is a lawyer by training, and is very strongly Catholic, (from 1925-1928 he was president of the Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française). The clandestine paper, Liberté, which was started in January 1941 and reached primarily a Catholic and rural audience, came out strongly for all the democratic liberties. The group behind Liberté consisted largely of democratic Catholics, including advanced anti-fascists; the leaders were against Pétain and the National Revolution.

The amalgamation of Libération Nationale and Liberté into Libération Française in the fall of 1941 was the product of a general movement towards unification of the various political trends in resistance, apart from the Communists. This trend continued after the formation of Libération Française. In the fall of '41 there were negotiations between the Libération Française groups on the one hand, and Trade Union groups (CGT and Christian) and Socialist party groups on the other. These working class elements were at the same time receiving overtures from Libération, Combat's nearest competitor today for preeminence among the Mouvements Unis de Résistance. In the fall of 1941 it was clear to the leaders of Libération Française (as to the leaders of Libération) that a mass movement of resistance would have to be based primarily on the working class element in the population. An agreement was reached whereby the Socialist party permitted its militants to join Libération Française.[1] It was estimated in 1943 that one-third of the members of Combat were Socialists or ex-Socialists. If this agreement seems surprising, two factors should be remembered: (1) the Socialist party reconstituted itself as a party, not as a movement of military or paramilitary resistance, a function which was to be performed by "pure resistance" movements, such as Libération Française, (2) at this period the editorial policy of Combat shifted to the left. In the first half of 1942 Combat moved into opposition to Pétain and the National Revolution,[2] publicly disavowing Général de la Laurencie[3] and came out in support of the "Republican

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[1] Cf. Vérités, #11 and 12, 15 and 25 September 1941; CID #18927, 4 June 1942; Résistance #7, 15 August 1941.

[2] OSS Biographical Records, Special Study #19, 29 December 1943.

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[1] CID #21009, 7 July 1942.
[2] Combat, January-July 1942; CID #18927, 4 June 1942.
[3] Combat, March 1942.

Traditions of 1789," rejecting the Vichy theorem (in relation to the Riom trial) that the 3rd Republic was responsible for the defeat. This shift in editorial policy was due to the necessity of taking into account the political sentiments of the mass of new adherents to the movement: liberal Catholics of the Liberté group, Socialists, Trade Unionists, and middle-class elements. Furthermore is it not likely that the group in Libération Française which had originally supported Pétain's National Revolution, shared the progressive general disillusionment with that system, and, through the novel experience of resistance, came to a new appreciation of the principles of equality, liberty, and fraternity?

In the second half of 1942 the following developments in Combat are observable: (1) the movement recognized de Gaulle as the leader of French resistance. This began in March, when the paper hailed the US government's recognition of the French Committee as the de facto authority in New Caledonia, and was strongly affirmed in the August issue, under the heading "all with de Gaulle." The December issue carried the Combat emblem, a "C" on a Cross of Lorraine. (2) A trend towards unification with the other large Unoccupied Zone movements, Libération, and Franc-Tireur, set in. The first half of 1942 had been marked by some rivalry between Combat and Libération: in August 1942 the journals of both movements carried an identical statement that the two movements have common aims, and that both recognize de Gaulle as the leader and symbol of resistance.

In 1943 the main developments of an organizational character were the participation of Combat in the formation of the Mouvements Unis de Résistance, the National Council of Resistance, and the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, which are considered in I,B.

b. The Organization and Activities of Combat. In 1941 the predecessors of Combat, Libération Nationale and Liberté, covered both zones, and published papers in both zones; in 1942 Combat (or, as it was then called, Libération Française) confined its propaganda to the South Zone, while claiming to have paramilitary groups in such widely scattered North Zone areas as Compiègne, Léon-Epernay, Reims, Cotentin-Calvados, Nantes-St. Nazaire, Vendée, Lorraine. In 1943 Combat was regarded as a South Zone organization, and its paper primarily obtains a South Zone circulation. Particular areas where it appeared to be strong in 1943 are Lyons, Languedoc, Haute-Savoie and Pyrénées-Orientales;[1] the fragmentary nature of the evidence on this point makes it entirely possible that there are other areas where it is equally strong. The activities of Combat may be classified under three heads:

i. Propaganda Activity. The paper Combat is one of the best-edited, best-printed, and most influential clandestine journals. Previously appearing every two weeks, in October 1943 it announced itself as a weekly; it is reported that about 60,000 copies are printed. There are also regional supplements appearing monthly for Lyon (20,000 copies) and Languedoc (10,000 copies). In addition leaflets are put in editions of 100-120,000, in which any of the campaigns listed under ii may be developed.

ii. Political and Organizational Campaigns. The ramifications of resistant activity may be illustrated by a consideration of the various activities involved in the campaign against the deportation of workers to Germany. Combat asks farmers and employers to send word by the chain if they can assure the livelihood of some who refuse to go to Germany; Combat appeals to employers, government officials, and police to sabotage the round-up of workers for Germany; the workers themselves are urged to organize "Patriotic Committees of Labor Action" and to strike and resist the deportation; popular demonstrations are to be organized; leadership and financial support has to be provided for those who have escaped to the Maquis; a "social service" has to be organized for the benefit of imprisoned militants and their families.

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[1] OSS Source A, #9104, 3 August 1943.

iii. Military Activities. At the beginning of the year Combat had a restricted number of groupes francs, actively engaged in industrial sabotage, destruction of specific targets, and attacks upon isolated German soldiers or Frenchmen in the pay of the Germans.[1] In addition they had a larger number of secretly organized militia, prepared to rise up in coordination with an Allied invasion. These military formations are now united with those of the Libération and Franc-Tireur, in the Mouvements Unis de Résistance (MUR). The MUR has in addition undertaken to provide the youth in the Maquis with the leadership and organization. Prior to the unification in the MUR, Combat had the largest paramilitary group (estimated at 25,000 in the South Zone in October 1942).

c. The Ideological Trends in Combat. Combat is the least homogeneous of any of the resistance groups; it reflects all the diverse trends of thought to be found in resistance as a whole. Through 1942 a distinctive emphasis on the Catholic point of view was observable in the national paper,[1] indicating the continued presence of the old Liberté group; the Catholic influence on the regional paper Combat de Languedoc continues to be strong. The army element probably continues to be predominantly in control of the military formations.[2] In 1943 the national paper and the Lyons edition featured Trade Union resistance regularly, but by no means exclusively.[3] With regard to Communist resistance, some changes in attitude took place: whereas in 1941 Libération Nationale had been strongly anti-Communist, in 1942 Combat accepted Communist resistance "in the fraternity of arms, with some reservations, however," expressing admiration for the resistance of French Communists and the Russians, but saying that Communism is "still a menace in the form of an authoritarian regime."[4] In 1943 Combat implicitly but not explicitly endorses the readmittance of the Communists into the illegally reconstituted CGT, and the cooperation of Communists with other Trade Union resistant elements on a local scale.[5] De Menthon has spoken in favor of Communist participation in the National Committee.[6] With regard to the future political regime, apart from explicit repudiation of any dictatorship "military, economic,

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[1] Actions reported in Combat, 1 September 1943.

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1. Particularly in Combat, December 1941, and August 1942.
2. CID #37126.
3. CID #39194.
4. Combat, July-August 1942.
5. Combat, 25 September 1943; Combat 15 June 1943, and Lyons Supplement, April 1943.
6. France, 16 November 1943.

or foreign," and a reassertation of the Republican ideal, the diverse trends in *Combat* do not seem to have reached agreement on a specific program, and the paper can do no more than call for a "4th Republic, rejuvenated from top to bottom based on liberty and social justice."[1] It is probable that the mutual distrust between certain parliamentarian party elements and certain "pure resistance" elements includes some elements in *Combat*. In North African sections of *Combat*, opposing "wings" have appeared: the same may happen in France. The extreme mutability of resistance thought, especially on the eve of and during the decisive period of liberation, defies prediction.

2. Libération

a. *The Ideology of Libération.* *Libération*, if both its North and South Zones sections are reckoned, is larger than *Combat*; within the South Zone it is not as strong as *Combat*. Though recruited from diverse elements, it is more homogeneous than *Combat*, and more to the Left.[2] Its original leadership included Trade Union, Socialist Party and Radical Party leaders, and some without previous affiliations. Those which are now known to the world include Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, journalist belonging to a family with Rightist traditions, André Philip, Christian Socialist professor and deputy; Pierre Vienot, former Socialist Minister; and Dumesnil de Grammónt, chief of the Scottish Rite Masons in France.[3]

Libération in 1941 was critical and suspicious of the Army element in *Libération Nationale* (forerunner of *Combat*), and this mutual distrust carried over into 1942, causing the leaders of Combat and Libération to issue a statement in August 1942 on the identity of aims of the two organizations and their common acceptance of the leadership of de Gaulle. The ideological trend in Libération may be distinguished from that of Combat by the following features, provided it is remembered that the general trend of development in resistant thought has been for originally divergent elements to converge.

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[1] *Combat*, 17 October 1943.
[2] CID #37126. April 1943.
[3] CID #51343.

i. From the beginning the paper of the movement was markedly Republican and anti-Pétain.[1]

ii. Libération has closer relations with the parliamentary party groups than does Combat. The North Zone paper has explicitly come out against the idea of perpetuating the resistance movement after the war as a political movement, emphasizing the necessary role of diverse political parties.[2] Combat has not taken a contrary view, but does not seem to have committed itself to a crystallized opinion on the subject.

iii. Libération, reflects the ideology of international liberalism (the Atlantic Charter, international organization) whereas Combat is more nationalist in tone.[3]

iv. While both Combat and Libération give equal support to Trade Union resistance, Libération is stronger in its emphasis on post-war social and economic reform to be achieved through the Trade Unions and the reconstituted parties.

Libération was the first of the major resistance groups to recognize de Gaulle as the leader of French resistance, in the first half of 1942.[1]

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[1] Cf. Libération #2, August 1941.
[2] Libération #5, January 1942; Libération, North Zone ##1-4, 28 August, 4, 11, 18 September 1942; CID #48117.
[3] Libération, North Zone, 20 February 1943; CID #48117.

b. *The Organization and Activity of Libération.* *Libération* is divided into a North Zone and a South Zone section. The two sections are coordinated, and follow the same policy, but are independent. They each publish their own edition of the paper of the movement, *Libération*; they each send their own delegates to the National Council of Resistance and to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers.

In the South Zone, *Libération* possesses an elaborate organization. At the top there are (1) a General Delegate (a sort of president), (2) a Political Committee, and (3) an Executive Committee comprising the General Delegate and the heads of the three central branches -- propaganda, political action, and paramilitary action. The movement is divided into seven regions, centering around Marseilles, Chambéry, Lyon, Montluçon, Limoges, Orange, and Toulouse. Each region is divided into districts (usually corresponding to departments) and each district into sectors. All of these units have leaders or chiefs.

The propaganda branch publishes a great many tracts -- half a dozen per month, in editions of 100,000 copies, it is claimed. It also puts out a paper, *Libération*; the South Zone edition appears every two weeks, with 70,000 copies, and the North Zone edition every week, 15,000 copies. Local editions of Libération in the South Zone appear also in the Lyons, Toulouse, and Basses-Alpes regions. The movement also publishes a paper for students, *Libre France*, and has just started a literary review, *Les Cahiers* de la Libération.[1]

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[1] CID #39194, 19 July 1943; CID #21009, 7 July 1942; OSS source A #14732A, 11 November 1943; CID #19307 - C; CID #19010, 21 July 1942.

The political action branch organizes sabotage in the establishments where the members are employed. Small cells are organized in a great many factories and government offices. Sabotage work is believed to be particularly effective in the regions of Grenoble, St. Etienne, Lyon, Montluçon. The same organization is used to effect strikes and demonstrations. In this work the Libération groups are now integrated with those of the other Mouvements Unis.

The paramilitary branch is also now integrated with that of the other Mouvements Unis de Résistance. Before the unification, the paramilitary formation of Libération was not as large as that of Combat: it was estimated at 15,000 men in the south zone in October 1942. Its organization is cellular, with about six men to a cell, and five cells forming a unit. In addition to this militia, Libération has a much more restricted number organized in groupes francs, for the destruction of military or industrial targets or of German agents. Their activity has been reported from the regions of Lyons, Bourg, St. Etienne, Toulouse, Marseille, Montlucon, Chambery.[2]

3. Franc-Tireur. The Franc-Tireur movement (not to be confused with the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, see VI,B) is considerably less powerful than either of the other two movements with which it has united to form the Mouvements Unis de Résistance. It has a miscellaneous following: it includes some Trade Union and Socialist

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[1] D'Astier de la Vigerie in France-Amérique, 5 December 1943.
[2] Libération #18, 15 September 1942; CID #21009, 7 July 1942; CID #37126, April 1943.

elements, but is primarily recruited from individuals who had not previously belonged to a mass organization, middle-class democrats and republicans, peasants, Catholics, Jews. Its closest ideological affiliation is with the old Radical Socialist Party. It has contacts with parliamentarians of the Herriot type. It should be remembered that the old Radical Socialist Party was not a mass organization, but consisted only of electoral committees; hence the organization of a mass resistance movement, without the advantage of the connections and experience provided by Trade Unionism, on the part of the amorphous following of the Radical Socialist Party, represents a very significant achievement.[1]

The ideology of the Franc-Tireur movement is in the tradition of French radical-socialist thought: Liberty, World Democracy, anti-Fascism, the Social Republic, are its slogans. It is against totalitarianism of the Right or the Left. It came out strongly in support of the defenders of the Riom trial, and has consistently denounced Pétain. It is also marked by the traditional radical-socialist hostility to the financial oligarchy of the Trusts.[2] Franc-Tireur recognized de Gaulle's leadership in March 1942, emphasizing the idea that de Gaulle is necessary at the head of a provisional government to maintain order in the period of transition, at the same time stating openly that they would be against him if "contrary to what he has always said, he envisaged a dictatorship."[3] In 1943 Franc-Tireur does not seem to have regarded it as necessary to repeat these reservations, though there is no doubt that its members have not departed

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1. CID #37126, April 1943.
2. Franc-Tireur, March 1942, September 1942, March 1943.
3. Ibid., March 1942, June 1942, etc.

from their principles. Their delegate to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, known as Jean-Jacques, has shown an independent attitude.[1]

Franc-Tireur is primarily a propaganda organization. It has published, since January 1942, a monthly paper of the same name, now having a circulation of 30-50,000. The Franc-Tireur group also has published Le père Duchesne since April 1942, a periodical for literary-minded people, in a style of vitriolic vituperation, appealing to a humanitarian liberalism which it bases on the traditions of the French Revolution, Montaigne, Rabelais, Hugo.[2]

In the field of action, Franc-Tireur endorses the same type of program as the other Mouvements Unis de Résistance (sabotage, strikes, demonstration, formation of a secret militia). In view of its social composition, it probably makes a special contribution to administrative sabotage, information gathering, and the provision of refuge and aid in peasant and bourgeois circles to fugitives from the Gestapo or from labor deportation.[3]

B. Front National[4]

The Front National de lutte pour l'indépendance de la France was launched in May 1941. It was launched under Communist auspices, and it is Communist-controlled, in the sense that its organization is dependent on the cooperation of the Communist organization. Grenier has stated that the Front National was constituted "as a result of the efforts of the Communist Party to coordinate the resistance of those who did not accept the Communist social program, but were for liberation."[1] Though the composition of its leadership is unknown, it may safely be assumed to include Communists. At the same time, the Front National undoubtedly contains numerous non-Communists probably even in the leadership. In its multiparous literature no specifically Communist propaganda can be found, though it follows the Communist tactics of extreme activist resistance. According to the Vichy police, members of the Front National, when arrested, are surprised to hear they belong to a Communist organization.

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[1] OSS #26471, 24 December 1943: compare also his emphasis on Consultative Assembly's role, Combat (Algiers) #90, 26 December 1943.

[2] CID #21009, 7 July 1942: Père Duchesne #1, April 1942.

[3] Franc-Tireur, September 1942, March 1943.

[4] General Source: French Basic Handbook, revised 1944 edition M.S., Part III, Chapter, XVI A.

The failure of the Communist attempt to unite all resistance in the Front National will be treated separately (see on the Communist Party, IV,C). It remains to consider the actual organization of the Front National.

The Front National is organized in three different dimensions:

1. The Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, are the paramilitary organization of the Front National on a national scale. (See VI,B).
2. There are also local and regional organizations. Such regional organizations are known to exist in Lyon, Nice, Oise, Picardie, Brittany.[2]
3. There are also organizations on a professional basis, publishing propaganda journals such as Le Palais

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[1] Les Documents, 1 February 1943.

[2] Cf. the clandestine papers Le Front Patriotique de Lyon; "83," paper of the Front Patriotique de la Jeunesse region nicoise; Patriote de l'Oise; Picardie Libre.

Libre for lawyers (Le Front National des Juristes), Les Lettres Françaises for writers, L'Universitaire Libre for university circles, L'Art Française for artists: others are said to exist for doctors and architects.

The Front National is relatively weak in the South Zone, being overshadowed by the Mouvements Unis de Résistance.[1] It is recognized as one of the five leading organizations in the North Zone: if volume of propaganda is a fair index, it is the strongest single North Zone organization.

C. Ceux de la Résistance

Ceux de la Résistance is the name of one of the five North Zone organizations who are represented in the National Council of Resistance and in the Consultative Assembly. It is connected with the paper Résistance, which was started in November 1942, and is published every two weeks in Paris.[2] From the start the paper has recognized de Gaulle as the leader of French Resistance.

The policies of this paper offer a considerable contrast to those of the group Combat, Libération, Franc-Tireur. From the start, it has shown great interest, even preoccupation, in post-liberation and post-war problems. Its slogan, to express the ideal for the future France, is the "National Community." In this future France, political parties will exist, but not in the fashion characteristic of the 3rd Republic: there should be fewer parties, and party strife must not again be allowed to endanger the National Community. Résistance regards all the old parties as discredited. The future France will also be a regime of social justice, apparently conceived somewhat on the pattern of the corporative Socialism of some types of Catholic theory. With regard to the post-liberation period of provisional government, Résistance urges "a certain authoritarianism" is necessary, which "is not a military dictatorship," to prevent civil war. The paper has also shown a tendency to look to a provisional government, headed by de Gaulle, and supported and controlled by the resistance movements, to lay the basis of the new France before the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy, which is postponed till normal times. Résistance has not been entirely consistent on this point: in July it advocated a speedy summoning of a National Assembly.[1]

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[1] Its existence in the South Zone is attested for Lyon and Nice: see above; cf. also OSS Source A #18483A, 8 January 1944.

[2] This paper has no connection with the mimeographed paper of the same name published in the winter of 1940-1, nor with Résistance, organ of Libération Nationale in August-September 1941: see CID #34809, 19 May 1943.

It is clear that Résistance reflects a point of view which has also influenced Pétain's internal program (though there is no evidence that Résistance groups were ever supporters of Vichy, it should be remembered that the paper only started publication in November 1942). The composition of the Résistance group is inadequately known: it is reasonable to suppose it is predominantly supported by Catholic bourgeois, professional and intellectual circles, including some Christian Trade Union elements and university youth.

Another clandestine paper which expresses related, but not identical views to those of Résistance is Défense de la France, which while Catholic in tone, and calling for an "authoritarian democracy" is distinguished from Résistance by the conservatism of its economic and social doctrine, being unique in the clandestine press in having advocated an

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1. Résistance #4-8, December 1942-February 1943, and 15 July 1943: CID #34809, 37126, 37127; OSS Source A, #1529, 25 November 1943; compare also article of J-J. Mayoux, delegate of Ceux de la Résistance to the Consultative Assembly in Combat (Algiers) #90, 26 December 1943.

alliance between de Gaulle and the powers of high finance.[1]

It is not clear how much resistance activity the group "Ceux de la Résistance" carry on apart from the distribution of their paper, nor how large the group is. In the summer of 1943 a regional edition was started for the Bordeaux area. An active sabotage group by that name exists in Lyon.[2] The theoretical preoccupation of the paper, contrasting with the general preoccupation of the clandestine press with sabotage, the fight against deportation, etc. suggests that they are less active. Its significance perhaps consists in the indication it provides of the variety of political currents in the underground movement, and the richness of the political debates that are conducted in it.

D. Ceux de la Libération

This is the name of one of the five North Zone organizations sending delegates to the National Council of Resistance and to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers. Nothing is known about Ceux de la Libération.

E. Organisation Civile et Militaire

This is one of the eight resistance groups participating in the National Council of Resistance. It represents the nucleus of resistance centering round ex-officers of the French Army, with their contacts in business, professional, and government circles. The Deuxième Bureau has assumed the direction of its clandestine activity.

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[1] Défense de la France, #27, 30, 40, 5 February, 30 March, and 30 October 1943; CID #48117, 20 June 1943; France (London) 7 December 1943. Similar tendency also in the clandestine paper Libérer et Fédérer.

[2] Défense de la France, 8 July 1943.

After the Armistice certain groups in the Army began preparing for the day when the Army would again take the field against the Germans. Illegal activity primarily took the form of concealing secret stores of arms, keeping in touch with demobilized soldiers, and political scheming to secure an anti-German administration in Vichy when the right moment came. The climax of these preparations was General Delattre de Tassigny's resistance to the total occupation of France in November 1942 (though OCM as such probably did not exist then). After the disbandment of the Armistice Army, the activities of nuclei of resistance in the Army became more restricted. To counteract the effect of demobilization, efforts were made to expand the Corps civile de l'Armée, to provide jobs for demobilized officers and men. A good many were placed in supervisory positions in the Chantiers de Jeunesse and other Vichy youth organizations. The OCM tries to keep such of these elements as are resistant in contact.[1] It also looks after such piles of military equipment as have not been confiscated by the Germans, and keeps names and addresses of demobilized soldiers. They are hampered by the fact that the Gestapo keeps former officers under surveillance: arrests have been made, and it is reported that the occupation authorities plan to round up all former officers and men of the French Army at the time of invasion.[2]

In addition, the civil or political branch of OCM keeps contacts with sympathetic business professional and government circles. Some of these contacts are with elements

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1. OSS #29002 Casablanca, 5 November 1943, OSS Source A #17139, 17 December 1943.
2. OSS Source O, #6100, 9 December 1943.

very close to the Vichy Administration: it is said that some of the members of OCM are members of the *Comité d'Etudes Technical et Syndical* (CETS) formed by Pucheu, Bichelonne, and Barnand.[1] This branch puts out a paper, *Les Cahiers de l'Organisation Civile et Militaire*.

The Army resistance differs in political outlook from the mass of the resistance movement as a whole. They are rightist, even fascist or monarchist in tendency; inclined to avoid political judgment of Vichy on the ground that the enemy is Germany; at the beginning of 1943 they favored Giraud rather than de Gaulle.[2]

In spite of the listing of OCM as a member of the National Council of Resistance in May 1943, relations between OCM and the rest of resistance continued to be distant, until the very end of 1943. In December 1943 complete unification was finally effected.[3]

The contribution of OCM to active resistance has been limited, partly by the conspicuousness of its members, partly by the fact that it has no mass following, and partly by the professional soldiers' scepticism towards military unorthodoxy. Probably its most valuable contribution has been in the way of providing the *Maquis* fugitives with leadership: the unification with the mass resistance groups may provide an opportunity for supplying their military formations with trained officers.

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[1] CID #38199, 9 July 1943; France (London) 7 December 1943.

[2] OSS Source A/17139, 17 December 1943; CID #38199, 9 July 1943; OSS Source A#16435, 6 December 1943; OSS #25124, 19 November 1943.

[3] This must be accepted as a fact in view of the receipt of three separate reports to the same effect: CID #52921, 24 December 1943; OSS Source A, #17139, 17 December 1943: OSS Source A #18969C, 15 January 1943. D'Astier de la Vigerie claimed a unification of the directing services in Algiers, in the debate on resistance of the Consultative Assembly, *France* (London), 12 January 1943. For previous aloofness of OCM compare OSS #16731, 15 May 1943.

F. *Forces Unies de la Jeunesse*

A further indication of the strong trend to unity is the existence, since the beginning of 1943, of a united youth movement, the *Forces Unies de la Jeunesse* (FUJ), which is an autonomous body constituted by the youth sections of various resistance movements. These constituent youth groups are: *Jeunes des Mouvements Unis des Résistance* (MUR); *Front Patriotique des Jeunes* (youth section of the *Front National*); *Jeunes de la Résistance* (youth section of *Ceux de la Résistance*); *Jeunes de l'Organisation Civile et Militaire* (OCM); *Jeunes Chrétiens de la Résistance*, comprising resistant groups in the *Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique* (JOC); *Jeunes Etudiants Catholiques* (JEC); *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française* (ACJF); and the Boy Scouts. The united youth movement has its paper, *Forces Unies de la Jeunesse*, which is published by the Toulouse regional committee of the FUJ. According to a recent report, elements of the youth elite associated with the now disbanded *Ecole nationale des Cadres* at Uriage, have joined the FUJ: these are probably to be identified as the *Jeunes de l'OCM*.[1]

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[1] *Forces Unies de la Jeunesse*, June and September 1943; *Revanche, organe du front patriotique des jeunes*, #22, July 1943; CID #39194; *Combat*, Lyon ed. January 1943. OSS Source A #17139, 17 December 1943.

III. UNDERGROUND LABOR UNIONS[1]

A. The Labor Legislation of the Vichy Government

Though Vichy has not declared Trade Unions illegal, it has enacted a series of restrictive laws: (1) it has abolished all organizations grouping members of different professions on a national plane, i.e. (in addition to employers unions) the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC); (2) all syndical organizations were placed under the control of Comités d'Organisation, corporative bodies appointed by the government, almost exclusively from representatives of big business interests; (3) the government was given the power to dissolve any professional organization by decree; (4) the government withdrew the right of collective bargaining and the right to strike.

In addition to these measures designed to render existing Trade Union organizations impotent, Vichy has also embarked on an ambitious program of social reorganization on corporative lines, embodied in the Labor Charter. Though the program has been only partially implemented, it has served to aggravate the hostility of Trade Unionists, particularly towards the clauses which call for a single compulsory union in each field (this outraged the Christian Trade Unionists, always jealous of their independence), and which set up mixed Comités Sociales, composed of employers, technicians, and workers as the real authorities on all questions relating to the profession.

It is clear that Vichy labor legislation served to aggravate the hostility of the majority of Trade Unionists towards a regime whose personnel, political policy, and international policy was objectionable to them from the start.

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[1] General source: French Basic Handbook, revised 1944, edition MS, Part III Chapter XIX.

1. The Demoralization of the Trade Union Movement. In spite of these antagonisms between the Vichy government and the Trade Unions aggravated by the disparity between frozen wages and a steeply rising cost of living, and in spite of the strength of the pre-war labor movement,[1] the Trade Unions as such have not been the major factor in resistance as might have been expected, though Trade Unionists in various organizations have been the backbone of resistance. This is due to the disunity that has reigned in the French Trade Union movement: the long-standing separation into CGT and CFTC; the duality in the CGT existing since the expulsion of the Communists in 1939; the divisions within the CGT since June 1940 as to tactics to be pursued; the adherence of some CGT and CFTC leaders to Vichy.

B. The Forms of Resistant Trade Union Activity

The existing confusion in Trade Unionism has resulted in a complexity in the forms of resistant Trade Union activity.

1. Vichy's attempt to dissolve the central Trade Union organizations merely led to their illegal reconstitution. Militant leaders of the CGT and CFTC responded to the dissolution by drawing up in November 1940 a joint manifesto

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[1] In 1936 the CGT claimed 5,000,000 members, and the CFTC, 500,000. In February 1940, after the expulsion of the Communists, and after mobilization, the CGT claimed 1,200,000; the membership of the CFTC had also declined.

insisting that syndicalism must be voluntary and free from government interference.[1]

2. Where a national, departmental or local union was controlled by a collaborationist, an illegal dual organization was set up as for example in the case of the Metal Workers Union, the Miners Union of Northern France, the Paris Union des syndicats, the departmental union Haute-Vienne, the Teachers Union, the federation of government employees.[2]

3. In some cases it was possible to get rid of the collaborationist leadership. Thus Dumoulin has been expelled from his post as secretary-general of the departmental union of the Nord, Vigne from the secretary-generalship of the Federation of Miners, etc.

4. In some cases the existant leadership was secretly resistant, or was converted to that policy by pressure from illegally organized committees within the organization.[3]

In implementing the policy of trying to win the officially approved organizations over to resistance, militant Trade Union leaders have had to combat the deep suspicion in which the official organizations are held by the workers. The workers have in fact been leaving the Trade Unions en masse. For example, the departmental union of the Nord had 100,000 members in 1935, and 3,000 in June 1942; the Miners of the Pas-de-Calais had 105,000 members in September 1939 and 11,000 in October 1942. On the other hand, a significant rise in membership is generally registered when an official union turns from collaboration to resistance.[1] The continued appeal of a genuine, free Trade Unionism cannot be doubted.

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[1] CID #34811, 20 May 1943.

[2] Allied Labor News, 4 November 1943; L'Ecole Laique (clandestine paper of national union of teachers).

[3] Including the Bourse du Travail at Toulouse, and the departmental unions of Haute-Garonne, Tarn-et-Garonne, Tarn, Aude, Hérault, Bouches-du-Rhone; CID #24701-C, 1 December 1942.

C. The Organization of the Trade Union Underground

The coordination of resistant Trade Union activity under the conditions outlined above was very difficult, and has not been completely achieved. There are various groups, each now crystallized round a clandestine Trade Union paper, each reflecting the direction of a different group of resistant Trade Union leaders, and often with different financial backing.[2]

1. Mouvement Ouvrier Français (MOF). This was set up in May 1942, on the initiative of Labor and Socialist leaders in Libération and Combat, such as André Philip and Léon Morandat.[3] It brought together CGT and CFTC resistance. Originally reserved in attitudes to de Gaulle, in 1943 it has shown no reservations in its recognition of de Gaulle. It was always a South Zone organization, and played an important role in organizing resistance to the deportation of labor to Germany in the fall and winter of 1942.[4] It has not succeeded in becoming the main center of resistant Trade Unionism, and its paper, started in June 1943, has been followed by others reflecting different tendencies.[5]

2. Les Informations Sociales, which describes itself as a "News Bulletin for Trade Union militants and the future

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1. Allied Labor News, 4 November 1943, instancing two branches of the Metal Workers Union which last year had a membership of 300 and 60 respectively, and this year have a membership of 4,000 and 1,175 respectively.
2. CID #49599; CID #21009, 7 July 1942.
3. Populaire, 15 June 1942; Libération, 24 June 1943; CID #48057; CID #37126, April 1943; OSS Washington, 20 November 1942.
4. CID #25602; 19 December 1942; CID #39264, 21 July 1943; CID #40530, 27 July 1943.
5. MOF's strength has been exaggerated by its representatives, desirous of getting British and American support; CID #34811, 20 May 1943.

social cadres of liberated France." This was started in the summer of 1943, and seems to reflect the post-war social program of André Philip.[1]

3. La Résistance Ouvrière. It started publication in August 1943. It describes itself as the "bond between French workers and CGT representatives around de Gaulle," and its purpose to "serve the CGT without compromising its unity or its independence." It reflects the views of Georges Buisson and Albert Buigui, who since 1943 have been delegates of the CGT in London and Algiers.[2]

4. Action. It started publication in October 1943. It calls itself the "social organ of Fighting France" and probably represents the more radical wing of the reconstituted CGT Bureau, typified by Gazier, the delegate of CGT resistance to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers.

5. La Vie Ouvrière. This is the Communist Trade Union paper, and has been in continuous publication since 1940.

6. In addition, the organs of "pure resistance" movements, Libération, Combat, and La Voix du Nord which include Trade Unionists in their leadership, have given reports and some direction to Trade Union resistance.[3]

D. Present Trends

In this confusion of diverse trends the following trends emerge.

1. The clandestine Bureau of the CGT is increasingly asserting its authority over its previous following. The collaborationist Trade Union leaders have admitted its

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1. CID #48057.
2. See La Résistance Ouvrière, #1, August 1943.
3. Léon Morandat in New Statesman, 19 December 1942, confirmed by labor articles in 1943 issue of Combat, Libération, and Franc-Tireur.

influence over the official ex-CGT unions.[1] It sends delegates to the National Council of Resistance and the Consultative Assembly in Algiers. In 1943 it replaced the MOF as the leading center of Trade Union resistance. The clandestine Bureau of the CGT was reorganized in the first half of 1943 so as to cancel the effect of the 1939 expulsion of the Communists. The Bureau now consists of eight members, three of which represent the reinstated Communist element.[2] The clandestine CGT seems to have taken the bit between the teeth, and while not disavowing its previous representatives with the Fighting French, Buisson and Guigui, regards itself as more adequately represented by its delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Gazier. The admission of the Communists to the CGT Bureau draws attention to the undoubted fact of a growth in their influence on labor resistance as a whole.[3]

2. Relations between the CGT and the CFTC are reported to continue to be good, as has been declared in public statements by Buisson (CGT) and Poimboeuf (CFTC).[4]

3. In 1943 there was an increase in liaison, and local liaison groups, linking the various organizations concerned with labor resistance, including the Mouvements Unis de Résistance, the Mouvement Ouvrier Français, and Communists. These liaison groups have been known variously as Committees of Labor Resistance, Committees of Syndical Unity and Action, and Committees of Patriotic Labor Action. These were organized for the purpose of organizing active resistance

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[1] OSS Source A, #16182, 1 December 1943.
[2] CID #45459, July 1943.
[3] CID #28591, 12 February 1943; CID #48057; OSS Algiers 13 January 1944.
[4] OSS Source A #14732A, 11 November 1943; CID #39014, June 1943.

(against the deportations and for sabotage) and of stimulating the legal Trade Unions to adopt a resistant attitude. They will presumably organize whatever general action is planned for workers at the time of invasion.[1]

The Trade Union resistance has as a whole recognized de Gaulle's leadership since 1942, while at the same time remaining jealous of their independence.[2] Reservations exist in some Trade Union circles as to de Gaulle's post-war role and towards the Rightist elements in de Gaulle's entourage.

Post-liberation planning has occupied a certain place in Trade Union resistance thought in 1943. A CGT program for the period of provisional government has been outlined. It shows the same insistence as does resistance as a whole on sanctions against collaborationists, and in the field of labor legislation demands a return to the 1939 status quo,[3] the confiscation of property of collaborators, and the maintenance of the Comités d'Organisation with a "democratic personnel nominated by the unions."[4]

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1. CID #48057, July 1943; CID #48117, July 1943; Action, organe sociale de la France Combattante, #1, 1 October 1943.
2. CID #28591, 12 February 1943; CID #34811, 20 May 1943.
3. On délégations du personnel the Bureau split, five favoring a return to the 1939 basis, and three for a return to the 1936 basis.
4. A 3-5 minority favored the suppression of the Comités d'Organisation.

IV. UNDERGROUND POLITICAL PARTIES

A. Rightist and Moderate Parties

Apart from the Socialists and Communists, four other political parties are recognized as participating in the National Council of Resistance: one rightist party, the Fédération Républicaine (or Union Républicaine Démocratique), two center parties, the Alliance Démocratique and the Démocrates Populaires (progressive Catholics), and one left party, the Radical Socialists.

So far as is known, of these parties only the Radical Socialists have established any network of clandestine nuclei; in the case of the Radical Socialist Party not very much has been accomplished, though their relations with the resistance group, Franc-Tireur, are close. For the rest their activity seems to have been limited to clandestine meetings of parliamentary groups, which have not produced any overt action welcomed by Resistance as a whole since Herriot and Jeanneney protested the closing of the Bureaus of the Chamber and the Senate.[1] The seating of representatives of these political parties in the National Council of Resistance and in the Consultative Assembly is not based on their contribution to resistance, but on a recognition of the role of political parties in any free government.

B. The Socialist Party[2]

1. The Socialist Party and Resistance. The French Socialist Party was demoralized by the events culminating in the fall of France and the establishment of the Vichy regime. In the 1930's Léon Blum's international policy was

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[1] OSS interview with Fernand-Laurent, 11 March 1943; CID #37126, April 1943; CID #21009, 7 July 1942; Rucart in France (London) 12 October 1943; CID #22849S.

[2] General sources: French Basic Handbook, revised 1944 ed. M.S., Part III, Chapter XVI B.

opposed by various dissident factions within the Socialist party: the Neosocialists led by Marcel Déat and Adrien Marquet, the Gauche Révolutionnaire (Trotskyist) led by Marceau Pivert, and the extreme pacifists led by Paul Faure. When these groups committed themselves to support of Vichy and collaborationism, an unbridgeable gulf opened in Socialist ranks. Of 190 Socialist deputies and senators, 26 voted against the grant of full powers to Pétain in July 1940, 60 voted for, (the rest abstaining or being absent).[1]

A large but undetermined number of the 250,000 members of the pre-war Socialist Party rejected collaborationism. They form a considerable fraction of the membership of resistance organizations, especially those grouped in the Mouvements Unis de Résistance, and also are active in Trade Union resistance.

In addition, a clandestine organization of the Socialist Party itself has taken place. This began early in 1941, under the leadership of André Philip in the South Zone, André Le Troquer in the North Zone, and Juste Evrard in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais. Clandestine papers were published in various regions. The movement, however, remained weak until 1942. Léon Blum's brilliant defense at the Riom trial did much to restore the party's prestige and morale.

The Socialist Party remains quite small in relation to its previous strength. In September 1943 it claimed 40,000 militant adherents, and in December 60,000.[2] The present organization is regarded by the Socialists themselves as only a "reconstitution of cadres."

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1. CID #34884, 19 May 1943.
2. Le Populaire, September 1943; Froment in France, 24 December 1943.

To that end, the party has conducted a purge, on both a national and a local scale. All parliamentarians who voted for full powers to Pétain have been excluded, though those "who immediately realized their error" can be provisionally reinstated by the national Executive Committee after active service to the movement. The same applies to members of General Councils who voted for resolutions in support of Pétain. In the Pas-de-Calais more than one-fourth of the old leaders have been excluded. On the other hand, reports indicate that a number of the Socialist parliamentarians who abstained or were absent from the vote on full powers to Pétain have been reinstated, and that in the Prohibited Zone (Nord and Pas-de-Calais) a number of Socialist holders of municipal offices have both continued in office and are in touch with the Socialist Party.[1]

Another factor which limits the present importance of the Socialist Party is the restricted nature of its activity. It is not itself a resistance group in the military sense, and has no subsidiary paramilitary organization. (There are, however, independent military groups under Socialist leadership.) It does whole-heartedly support the active resistance movement. It contributes political guidance: for example it campaigned for the unification of resistance which was realized in May 1943; it has opposed the tendency of some resistant circles to favor a one-party system after the war;[2] it has taken a stand on various political issues, such as de Gaulle's role, the Darlan and Giraud administration in North Africa, etc. It also makes effective contribution, from a

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[1] CID #48057; CID #37126, April 1943; L'Espoir, September 1943.
[2] R & A London, 25 June 1943.

Socialist point of view, to the propaganda campaign against Vichy policies and collaborationism. At the same time, it regards the rebuilding of the Socialist Party itself as its primary objective.

There can be no doubt that the Socialist Party has potentialities for very considerable expansion in numbers and influence after liberation. The work of reconstituting the Party has been definitely successful; a parliamentary framework should attract to it many who, in a framework of underground resistance, are attracted to the Communists. The degree to which its influence can be expected to be larger than its membership is shown by the fact that in 1936, with 250,000 members, it polled 1,887,000 votes (the largest of any party).[1]

2. Organization of the Socialist Party. In 1942 the Party was organized under the direction of separate Comités d'Action Socialiste for the South Zone, the North Zone, and the Prohibited Zone. The South Zone Comité consisted of four members: two socialists elected to public office, and two militants. Under it were thirteen regional prefects; under them were departmental prefects (covering all departments except three); under them, chefs de centres d'études et de propagande; under them, the militants. A similar organization obtained in the other zones. In the middle of 1943, the North and South Zone organizations were linked, by placing each organization under a Comité Directoire, subordinate to a national Comité Exécutif.[2]

The Socialist party is strong in the Departments of

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[1] CID #34884, 19 May 1943.
[2] CID #37126, April 1943; CID #21009, 7 July 1942.

Nord and Pas-de-Calais; in the former Occupied Zone it is strongest in Gironde, Touraine, and Brittany; in the South Zone it is organized round eleven centers: Marseille, Valence, Lyon, Monluçon, Clermont-Ferrand, Limoges, Perigueux, Agen, Toulouse, Pau, and Montpellier.[1]

The Socialists publish ten clandestine papers, of which the most important is Le Populaire, which first appeared in May 1942 and has a present circulation of 25,000 copies. Their clandestine propaganda work has received financial support from sympathetic organizations outside France (including the USA).[2]

3. Policy of the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party has accepted de Gaulle's leadership since June 1942. The official organ of the party, Le Populaire, has always made clear that its recognition of de Gaulle was based on an acceptance of his pledge to restore democratic liberties and the Republic. It is known, however, that there are varying degrees of confidence in de Gaulle in Socialist circles. Le Populaire has made the same representations with regard to American policy towards de Gaulle, Darlan, Giraud, as has the underground press in general.[3]

The post-war policy of the Socialist Party is orientated (a) towards the restoration of a parliamentary democracy; (b) within this framework, the Socialists will work for a coalition similar to the Popular Front, in which they will be the essential bridge between the Communists and the "organizations of advanced bourgeois democracy";

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[1] CID #28591, February 1943; CID #34884, 19 May 1943.

[2] CID #49599.

[3] Le Populaire, November 1942, January, March, September 1943; CID #34811, May 1943; L'Espoir, July 1943. This is true in spite of private assertions by Socialists that Socialists have "led the opposition to the anti-American and anti-British tendency." (CID #49599).

(c) this coalition will work for a "Socialist Democracy"; (d) the social program includes nationalization of industrial monopolies, public utilities, banks and insurance companies; inclusion of workers and technicians in the management of big and medium-sized business; "distribution of wealth,"[1] etc.; (e) in the international sphere they have appealed for a Federation of Peoples, based on cooperation between the USA, Great Britain, France, and the USSR.

It deserves to be noted that there are divergent currents of thought among Socialists. The clandestine Socialist press has implicitly admitted that the militants have not always accepted the decisions of the central authority.[2] Militants who are active in resistance organizations are liable to a conflict of loyalties:[3] there are reports that Socialists find themselves opposed to the "imprudent activities" of the Mouvements Unis de Résistance (in which there are a great many Socialists).[4] Differences in attitude toward de Gaulle have been noted. It is reported that the North Zone organization has had a more independent attitude toward de Gaulle; this is attributed to the alleged fact that the South Zone organization is more financially dependent on the French Committee. This is, however, no ground for questioning the sincerity of those Socialists, like Philip and Le Troquer, who have been consistently "Gaulliste."

There is also a Socialist splinter-group which is urging a Socialist revolution as the only means of liberating France, and which is in opposition to both Gaullism and

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1. André Philip in Echo d'Alger, 19 December 1943; Le Populaire, November and March 1943.
2. L'Espoir, July 1943.
3. Ibid., August 1943.
4. CID #49599.

Communism.[1]

It is evident that the leaders of the Socialist Party follow a policy of restricting present collaboration with the Communists to the degree regarded as necessary for the cause of national liberation, and while contemplating a post-war alliance with the Communists and others, along the lines of the Front Populaire, continue to distrust Communist methods and ambitions.[2]

C. The Communist Party[3]

1. The Communist Party Line since June 1940. The French Communist Party, having abandoned the policy of collective security after the Russo-German pact of 1939, adopted a position of opposition to the war, and its defeatist campaign brought down upon it the government decree of 26 September 1939 which declared the party illegal.

After the armistice the Communist propaganda line became more complicated: on the one hand it attacked Pétain and collaborationist labor leaders as traitors; on the other hand it continued to regard the war as an "imperialist war"; "we do not want Frenchmen to be soldiers for England, with de Gaulle, or soldiers for Germany, with Laval and Doriot."[4] The result was that while the Vichy authorities pursued the Communists with vigor, the Germans were tolerant of their activities in the Occupied Zone for a while, allowing, for example, the continuance of Communist mayors in office. Relations with the Germans began to be troubled in October

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[1] Cf. The clandestine papers, L'Insurge, organe socialiste de libération prolétarienne.

[2] CID #52386; CID #39014; Le Populaire, 18 June 1942; CID #37126, April 1943.

[3] General Sources for this chapter. French Basic Handbook, revised 1944 edition MS Part II, Chapter XVI A. Various numbers of L'Humanité, La Vie Ouvrière, La Terre, La Vie du Parti.

[4] L'Humanité, January 1941.

1940, when 300 Communists (including Grenier) were arrested in Paris. The party does not seem ever to have linked its cause with that of the Germans: it conducted, for example, a campaign against anti-Semitic measures.

An anti-German orientation of the Communist line developed, as it was developing in Russian diplomacy also, before the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities. In May 1941 an appeal was launched, under Communist auspices, for the formation of a _Front National de lutte pour l'Indépendance de la France_. Whether this represented a submission of the party line to the overwhelming anti-German sentiment of the French people, or a shrewd guess on the direction which international developments were taking, cannot be ascertained, since in the next month the outbreak of the Russo-German war put an end to the contradictory position in which the Communists found themselves.

Since June 1941, the French section of the Communist International has thrown all its energy into organizing and stimulating French resistance. The party's propaganda has been violently nationalistic in reference, and Jacobin in tone. While the doctrines of Marxian socialism continue to be given in inner party circles, and the infallibility of Marxian science is emphasized in approaches to intellectuals,[1] Communist mass propaganda is directed almost exclusively to stimulating the struggle for national liberation, and to give directives as to the methods to be pursued in the struggle.

This turn in Communist propaganda, and the establishment of connection between Communists, other resistance movements, and the French National Committee, created a situation which made the dissolution of the Comintern apparently acceptable to old-time Marxists, and no doubt welcome to the following attracted by the purely nationalist line.[1]

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[1] Particularly in _Les Cahiers du Bolchévisme_.

Occasional references to Socialism and the definitive suppression of the "trusts" as a post-war goal are made. The news presentation is of course markedly pro-Russian, and pro-Russian propaganda is conducted by the regular publication of Russie Aujourd'hui. A special anti-Anglo-American orientation, such as some observers have reported, is not detectable in overt Communist propaganda; their expressions on American policy toward France are not essentially different from the non-Communist underground press.[2] In the recent discussion of the provisional government of France the Communist public statements are studiously republican and democratic in tone, while indicating insistence on a reversion to the social legislation of 1936, and echoing the underground's general attitude of intransigeance on the "purge" of political and economic administration.[3] Specifically socialist agitation is being held in reserve.[4]

2. Communist Organization and Activity. The framework of the Communist Party's structure is composed of: (1) a directing body acting outside of Metropolitan France; (2) an executive committee inside France of which the headquarters are believed to be in Paris; (3) directorates for the North and South Zones, which issue current instructions; (4) regional and departmental directorates transmitting

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1. Compare the manifesto "The French Communist Party approves the dissolution of the Communist International."
2. Samples, OSS source A #15929, 25 November 1943. On the other hand, they demanded the 2nd Front more vigorously than the others.
3. Waldeck-Rochet in France, 3 and 8 January 1944.
4. CID 42958C, Survey of French Clandestine Press, 14 July 1943.

and executing the orders of the zonal directorates; (5) sections, directed by committees of three, one for political direction and the struggle against the police, one for propaganda, one for organization of Communist groups; (6) the quartier, forming a liaison between the section and the Party cells; (7) finally, the Party cells which generally consist of not more than three members, and which come into being wherever three members have made contact, either locally or in the place of their work. Although the Party has lost a few of its national leaders since 1939 through defections and German executions, it would appear that the Communists have preserved the organization and pre-war leadership more than any other party.[1]

The pre-war membership of the Communist Party was about 300,000. Until the beginning of 1943 new recruits were taken in only with extreme caution and hesitation.[2] In 1943, however, owing apparently to the decimation of Communist rank and file by executions, arrests, and deportations, a policy of active recruiting was launched[3] according to a method whereby groups of three are to be formed by individual initiative, which will only be contacted by the regional organization after the group has proved itself by action. No information is available on the numerical strength of the Party: the above-mentioned factors make it reasonable to assume that it is below the 1939 figure of 300,000, though the Party members would be only a small minority of the Communist sympathizers. The main centers of Communist activity at the present time are Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, St. Etienne,

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1. L'Humanité, 15 July 1943; De Bund, Bern 17 December 1943.
2. OSS source A, #17934, 30 December 1943.
3. La Vie du Parti, May 1943.

Marseille, Clermont-Ferrand. They are relatively weaker in the South Zone.[1] The efficiency of the Communist underground is universally admitted; it disposes of ample funds, presumably including subsidies from abroad.[2] At the same time it should be remembered that Communists produce more sound and fury per member than any other group, and hence can easily appear more numerous than they actually are.

Apart from the activities which Communists carry on in other organizations (primarily the Front National, see II, B, and the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, see VI, B) the Communist Party as such carries on a vigorous life of its own:

a. Propaganda. The party issues numerous leaflets, as well as the following papers: L'Humanité, the official organ of the party, once a month in four regional editions of 70,000 each; La Vie Ouvrière, the official paper for trade unionists, with about 70,000 circulation; L'Avant-Garde, the paper for the Communist youth organization; La Terre, for peasants; Russie Aujourd'hui.

b. Intelligence and Liaison.

c. Infiltration into the public services of the Vichy Administration, and such organizations as the Légion des Combattants, for purposes of administrative sabotage and undermining of collaborationist morale; also of the Vichy-sanctioned Trade Unions, to stimulate resistance.

3. Communist Tactics in Resistance. The Communists have, since June 1941, been the extremist advocates of a policy of immediate action on all possible fronts, strikes, sabotage, guerrilla activity, demonstrations, etc., and have consistently striven to develop minor incidents into major

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[1] CID #21009, 7 July 1942; CID #37217, April 1943.
[2] CID #49599; CID #37217, April 1943.

incidents (for example, a strike in one factory into a general strike in the locality). The polar opposite of this tactic is the one advocated by some military elements in resistance, which emphasizes rather the preparation of a secret army which would take the field only on the day of Allied invasion. In between there are various shades of opinion.. In 1943 the necessity of immediately resisting the deportation of French labor to Germany, brought the two schools of thought closer together. At present the Communist orders for action to be taken by Party members at the time of Allied invasion are modelled on those issued by the National Council of Resistance to which the Communist Party belongs.[1]

4. The Communists, Other Resistance Groups, and Fighting France. With the adoption of the nationalist line in June 1941, the Communists also decided to work for the unification of all French resistance. Until 1943, however, they insisted that this unification should take place under the aegis of the Communist-controlled Front National. This goal was never achieved. Front National is now recognized as only one of five main resistant organizations in the North Zone. The Communists in 1943 apparently accepted this position, since they accepted the unification of French resistance under the National Council of Resistance, in which Front National is one of eight resistance groups sending delegates, and the Communist Party is one of six political parties sending delegates. Furthermore, a recent manifesto of the Front National calls for the formation of committees of Fighting France (i.e. including the various resistant organizations) in every locality, and not as previously committees of the Front

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[1] Waldeck-Rochet in France, 21 December 1943; CID #39261, 21 July 1943; L'Humanite, 15 April 1943.

National.[1]

Attacks on Gaullisme in the Communist propaganda ceased soon after the adoption of the line of total resistance. Agreement between the French National Committee and the Communist Party was not reached till November 1942, and Grenier arrived in London in January 1943.[2] Since then the Communists have maintained official links first with London, then with Algiers, and the Communist clandestine press has given full support to the National Committee and demanded its full recognition by the Allies. Recently the Communists demanded that the Committee declare itself the provisional government of France. At the same time the Communists belong to the radical wing of the Consultative Assembly, which is critical of the National Committee on such issues as the purge and the arming of the underground. The failure of the Communists and de Gaulle to reach agreement on Communist participation in the National Committee is significant, as are some expressions in Communist statements on a provisional government, which are designed to suggest dictatorial aspirations on the part of de Gaulle.[3]

5. Communist Intentions at the Time of Allied Invasion. The question must first be clarified, by distinguishing a national insurrection against the Germans and the Vichy government, from a specifically communist revolution to install a dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e. the Party. The former is the declared program of the communists, as of the resistance movement as a whole. As to the question

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[1] Compare the manifesto "The French Communist Party approves the dissolution of the Communist International."
[2] CID #38647.
[3] Marty in France, 27 November 1943; Waldeck-Rochet in France 2 and 8 January 1944.

whether the communists plan to develop the national insurrection into a social revolution, the evidence is as follows:

a. A number of observers inside France credit them with this intention.[1] On the other hand, the attitude of these observers is often such as to suggest that in their eyes a national insurrection against the Vichy government would be the same thing as a social revolution. Hence it is not clear that their views really credit the communists with intentions essentially different from those of the resistance movement as a whole.

b. The communist propaganda line, analyzed above, has been up to the present such that it is true to say that communist rank and file has up to now not been indoctrinated to regard Allied invasion as an opportunity for a specific communist uprising. On the other hand, the French communists up to 1941 and since have shown the same ability to change the line as is shown by the Communist Parties of other countries.

c. The Communist Party, has by its universally recognized patriotic activity since June 1941, won the respect of anti-communist Frenchmen, and the adherence of many, particularly in the Front National and its military formation, the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, whose support of the communists is not more than the support of what they consider to be the most effective resistance group.[2] It is to be questioned whether the communist leaders would risk losing this support, or whether these supporters would follow them, in an insurrection which had goals clearly distinct from those of resistance as a whole.

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[1] OSS source A #17934 and #17921, 30 December 1943; OSS source B #33586, 30 December 1943.

[2] OSS source A #17934, 30 December 1943.

d. If the resistance movement as a whole is persuaded that essential points which it expects a provisional government to satisfy are in danger of not being satisfied, a discontent is likely to be generated which may make possible an oppositional movement including the communists and at least sections of the Resistance movement. The communist leader, Grenier, has stated that "any attempt to rehabilitate Vichy would deal a fatal blow to the statesmen or governments which attempted it."[1]

e. The record shows that the leaders of the Communist Party will adopt no policy which is contrary to the interests of the USSR. The question will therefore be decided within the broader framework of relations between the USSR, Great Britain, and the USA.

6. The Communist Influence on the Population as a Whole. It is considered certain that the Communist Party would command considerably greater support at a free election now than at any former period.[2] This is due to:

a. The admiration of all classes of Frenchmen for the courage, discipline, and skill shown by the communists in resistance, the number of their "martyrs of resistance" (30,000 out of a total of 50,000 executions, according to a non-communist source),[3] and patriotism, rather than social revolution which has inspired their martyrs.

b. The misery and discontent prevalent in France, the pauperization of the lower middle classes, and the disparity between wages and cost of living.

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[1] Les Documents, 1 February 1943.
[2] OSS #25034, 19 November 1943; OSS source B #B-49, 12 November 1943.
[3] CID #50790.

c. The admiration of the French public for the achievements of the Red Army.

Though the French grand bourgeois, military, and haut-fonctionnaire classes remain anti-communist, though the peasants, at present discontented, are likely to resume their conservative role, though the leaders of all political parties and many labor leaders continue to be distrustful of the communists, the mobilizing of an anti-communist bloc is not regarded as an immediate possibility.[1]

The resistance movement as a whole is committed to collaboration with the communists, though there is an undercurrent of friction, varying in degree in different localities and with different movements.[2]

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[1] OSS source A #17934, 30 December 1943.

[2] CID #50476, September 1943; CID #42958, 14 July 1943.

V. CATHOLIC RESISTANCE

According to French Catholic sources, the dominant fact as regards French Catholicism has been the fact that in contrast with the opportunism of the hierarchy, there has been a participation of numerous Catholics in resistance.[1] The resistance group which has most Catholics in it is *Combat*, though other clandestine papers (*Résistance*, *Défense de la France*, *La Voix du Nord*) show Catholic influence. The lower clergy have done outstanding service to the cause of resistance. In addition to this Catholic participation in resistance groups, Catholic resistants as such have put out several clandestine papers. Cooperating since July 1942 with the Protestant resistant group which used to publish *La Feuille*, they publish *Les Courriers du Témoignage Chrétien* (originally *Les Courriers du Témoignage Catholique*) and *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*. *Les Cahiers* are extended expositions (about 50 pages) of resistant Catholic doctrines. Originally these Catholic papers confined themselves to criticism of German policy. Since 1943 they have advocated active resistance. They have not recognized de Gaulle directly, but they encourage Catholic youth to join the *Forces Unies de la Jeunesse*, to which explicitly Gaullist youth groups (and even communist youth groups) are affiliated. The general tendency of Catholic resistant thought is democratic in politics and leftist in social policy, and opposed to communism.[2]

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1. CID # 21351
2. *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, May, July 1943; CID # 19019; *Les Documents*, 15 July 1942; CID # 42958C, July 1943.

VI. THE SECRET ARMY

A. The Secret Army as a Whole

One of the results of the establishment of the National Council of Resistance in May 1943 was the setting up of machinery for the coordination of all the military groups in the underground. At that time a scheme for a unified command was set up, under a commander in chief who would work in liaison with the Allied command, and under a single leadership in each region and locality. What degree of coordination has actually been achieved is problematical, as is the degree of disorganization consequent upon such arrests of leaders of the Secret Army as have taken place or will take place in the future.[1] It does, however, seem that the broad lines of strategy are laid down by the National Council of Resistance and accepted by individual groups in a form adapted to their own situation.

The Secret Army at the end of October 1943 was composed of forces of two types: (1) the Secret Army, or Armée Secrète (AS), consisting of 180,000 men, holding themselves in reserve for the Allied invasion; (2) Action Immédiate (AI), consisting of 70,000 men, already engaged in operations against the Germans. Action Immédiate is composed of 32,000 for sabotage activities and 38,000 for guerrilla operations including 15,000 in the Maquis (see VI, C). Direction is in the hands of twelve regional commands who control both AS and AI. Action Immédiate, in relation to Allied invasion, has two functions: (1) the destruction of strategic objectives; (2) the protection of strategic points from destruction by the enemy. The AS, if adequately armed and supported, has the following possibilities: (1) cutting communications between France and Italy at the Alps;

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[1] An almost total liquidation of Secret Army leaders is reported in OSS source A #17720, 29 December 1943.

(2) isolating Marseille from Toulouse; (3) isolating Bordeaux from Loire; (4) holding strong points from which raids could be made, such as Vercors, Jura, Donon, Argonne.[1]

As to equipment, in October 1943, of the 70,000 men in AI, 15,000 were adequately equipped. The proportion of the AS group adequately armed is much lower.[2]

It is altogether probable that at the time of liberation the underground forces will be increased very considerably over the number of those already organized.

The Secret Army, as is shown by its spokesmen in Algiers, is disappointed in the amount of military supplies which the Allies have given, and in the degree of liaison with the Allied command established. In particular, the mobilization of the AS group for the type of operations outlined above is rendered extremely difficult without close liaison with the Allied command.[3] The AI groups, which function each in their own locality, is perhaps in a more independent position. It is altogether probable that at least the AI group will attempt to seize control of strategic points (communications, administration, etc.) even if no greater measure of liaison between the Allied command and the underground forces is established. The underground workers, in particular transportation, communications, and public utilities, are in a position to make a real contribution to the Allied military effort.

B. Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP)[4]

The *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans* have been the paramilitary resistance group most active in guerrilla operations, and are largely under communist direction. As in the case of the Front National, of which the FTP are the military arm, the communists have aimed at including non-communists, and the FTP therefore refrain from party politics. The Communist Party is aiming at incorporating 20% of its members in the FTP (the figure was raised from 10% to 20% in the spring of 1943), a fact which may indicate anxiety to keep the FTP in the Party's control.

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[1] OSS Berne, 27 October 1943.

[2] OSS Berne, 27 October 1943. German seizures of hidden arms are going on all the time -- see for example CID #51366, November 1943.

[3] A detailed analysis of the process of AS mobilization, with recommendations as to liaison with the Allied command, as given in OSS source A #17120, 29 December 1943.

[4] General source: *French Basic Handbook*, revised 1944 edition MS, Part III, Chapter XVI A.

The FTP have been the organization most active in such guerrilla activities as dynamiting, train-wrecking, attacks on isolated German detachments. This is the opinion of competent analysts; it also follows from the fact that their communiques are much more extensive in claims than those of any other organizations: indeed tributes to the FTP are found in the papers of other organizations.[1] The claim made in the Consultative Assembly by the communist, Grenier, that numerous actions credited to "patriots" in press releases were the work of the FTP, was not denied by the other resistance delegates.[2] The claims made in the communiques of the FTP (published in their organ, France d'Abord) are impossible to check. A summary of the communiques issued from 1 April -- 1 September 1943 by the FTP North Zone reports 279 attacks on railroads, 357 locomotives put out of use, 18 attacks on enemy detachments, attacks on food and industrial products destined for Germany, 980 German officers and men killed, including Generals Schaumburg and Ritter. Independent sources show that constant attacks of this sort are being maintained, without indicating the organization responsible in each case. The prominence of the FTP in active guerrilla operations does not mean that they are the principal component of the 'Secret

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[1] e.g. Défense de la France, July 1943.
[2] Journal Officiel de la République Française, 8 January 1944.

Army' of the underground as a whole, which they are not. It only means that they have concentrated on this type of operation, whereas other groups have in the past tended to keep more in reserve for the day of invasion and 'national insurrection.'

There is no reliable information on the strength of the FTP. It is believed that the force is composed of 30,000 men taking part in present activities, and could mobilize a much larger number at the time of invasion, though it is almost certain that there would not be enough arms for a large proportion of them. FTP detachments have been reported in Normandy, Picardy, Nord, Ile-de-France, Saone et Loire, Loiret, Nièvre, Yonne, Corrèze, and the Centre.[1]

The FTP is for the most part organized so that the members live a normal life and only come together to carry out a specific task. If the FTP have been thus active, and if, as seems likely, they have received little in the way of supplies of arms from abroad, it appears probable that they must have long practiced techniques of securing arms from the enemy. The organization is directed by a *Comité Militaire National*, which gives orders to regional committees throughout the country;the latter have under them military instructors who are sometimes ex-officers and NCO's. The FTP have been taught to regard themselves as *de facto* soldiers, and as such entitled after liberation to all the rights and compensations of ex-servicemen.[2]

The FTP has made a considerable effort to organize the *réfractaires* in the *Maquis*. In this field it has had competition from both the *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* and separate military resistance groups. In this field it seems as if the FTP were

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1. CID # 45795, September 1943; *Le Franc-Tireur Normand et Picard*; *France d'Abord*, 15 March 1943 and May 1942; *Le Franc-Tireur, organe des FTP du Centre*.
2. *Free France*, 15 June 1943.

less successful than the other groups.

The FTP publishes its paper on a national scale, France d'Abord "organ of information, liaison, and battle of the FTP," as well as regional papers.

Some general coordination in planning between the FTP and other paramilitary groups was achieved in 1943 on a national scale through the National Council of Resistance, and on a regional scale through liaison committees. Nevertheless divisive jealousies have persisted: in some regions liaison has been broken off;[1] the spokesmen of the FTP in Algiers want more publicity for their own group, and charge that it has been discriminated against in the matter of supplies of arms.[2]

C. The Maquis

The Maquis are groups of young men who have taken flight into the mountainous regions of France to avoid deportation to Germany, or assignment to work in German-controlled enterprises in France. A spontaneous movement for this purpose developed at the end of 1942 and continued through the first nine months of 1943. The resistance movements have applied themselves to organize the Maquis into units capable of taking military action against the Germans. The task was a very considerable one, for which they had not made prior preparations. On the whole they succeeded, although there have remained some autonomous or undisciplined groups.[3] Even greater was the problem of supplying the Maquis with food and clothing, not to speak of arms. In some areas arrangements were worked out with the local peasantry whereby the Maquis got paid for working as agricultural laborers; the underground embarked on a campaign to raise funds for the Maquis; raids were made on the supplies of such institutions as the Chantiers de Jeunesse and the Secours National.[1] However, recourse to "requisitions" on the local peasantry in certain areas could hardly be avoided;[2] while Vichy denunciations of the banditry of the Maquis cannot be taken at their face value, and while Maquis spokesmen say that receipts are given for articles requisitioned, to be honored by a liberated France, the whole situation made the morale of the Maquis and good relations with the local peasantry difficult to maintain. In addition, on the whole the Maquis lived in a state of armed truce rather than active hostilities with the Vichy authorities and the Germans; this tended to evaporate enthusiasm.[3] The Maquis also lived in expectation of an invasion of France "before the leaves of autumn"; when this failed to materialize, they lent an ear to the appeals of Vichy to return after the Laval-Sauckel agreement of October ostensibly had ended the deportation program. A great many then began drifting back into the cities as winter set in, relying on fake identification papers.[4]

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[1] In Corrèze, on orders of Grenier, CID # 45795, September 1943.
[2] Journal Officiel de la République Française, 8 January 1944.
[3] OSS source B # 22386, 31 December 1943.

These factors have all led to a decrease in the importance of Maquis resistance. The one thing that could have maintained their full strength, large supplies of food and clothing by Allied parachutage, was not forthcoming. In spite of all, however, a considerable nucleus still exists in the Maquis.

Numbers in the Maquis. In the fall of 1943 estimates of the number organized in guerrilla groups in the Maquis varied from 15-100,000, the most likely figure being 25,000.

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[1] OSS, R & A London, 31 August 1943.
[2] OSS Source, A #15747, 24 November 1943.
[3] OSS #24962, 16 November 1943.
[4] OSS #24464, 2 November 1943.

The center of gravity was in the Alpine region of Savoie and Haute-Savoie; other groups were reported in Dauphiné, the Massif Central (especially Corrèze), the Pyrenees, and Brittany. Today 15,000 would probably be a liberal estimate.[1]

Organization of the Maquis. The Maquis have been given organization and leadership by three main groups (1) the Mouvements Unis de Résistance; (2) military men, either independent or belonging to the OCM, particularly ex-officers of the Chasseurs Alpins in the Savoy; (3) the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans. On the whole army leadership is predominant.[2] An attempt has been made to organize a unified command of the Maquis on a departmental and regional basis, and to coordinate the command of the Maquis with that of the Secret Army as a whole. Liaison has, however, up to now been imperfect, the communist-controlled FTP showing particular aloofness.[3]

The armament at the disposal of Maquis groups is, so far as is known, on the same level as that of the Secret Army as a whole (see above).

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1. CID #48569, 3 November 1943; CID #51366, November 1943; OSS Source A #17934, 30 December 1943 (estimates 10,000 still in Savoy); OSS #25124, 19 November 1943 (20,000); OSS Source B #21541, 5 December 1943 (25,000 in August); OSS Berne, 27 October 1943 (15,000).
2. OSS Source A #21541, 5 December 1943.
3. OSS #29002 Casablanca, 5 November 1943; #5509, #5504, #5601; CID #50791, 6 December 1943.